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Аbstract
Today the Central Asian region was the focus of attention of the leading powers and international 
organizations, has become a wide range and composition of cooperation and at the same time, the scene of 
rivalry of various forces for their influence. In the first place this is due to the geostrategic importance of the 
region, its powerful oil-gas and other mineral resources.
Keywords: Central	Asian	region,	European	Union,	geopolitics,	foreign	policy.
Аңдатпа
Бүгінде Орталық Азия аймағы жетекші алпауыт мемлекеттер мен халықаралық ұйымдардың 
назарын аудартқан, әріптестік қатысушыларының құрамы және ауқымы бойынша үлкен алаңына 
айналып отыр, сонымен қатар, қазіргі таңда аймақ өз ықпалын арттыру бойынша бәсекелесуші 
күштердің сахнасы болып отыр. Ең алдымен бұл аймақтың геосаяси маңыздылығымен, ірі 
мұнай – газ және өзге де минералды ресурстарымен түсіндіріледі. 
Тірек сөздер: Орталық	Азия	аймағы,	Еуропалық	Одақ,	геосаясат,	сыртқы	саясат.
Аннотация
Сегодня Центрально-Азиатский регион оказался в фокусе внимания ведущих держав 
и международных организаций, стал полем широкого по диапазону и составу участников 
сотрудничества и в то же время ареной соперничества различных сил за свое влияние. 
Прежде всего, это обусловлено геостратегической значимостью региона, его мощными 
нефтегазовыми и другими минерально-сырьевыми ресурсами. 
Ключевые слова:	Центрально-Азиатский	регион,	Европейский	Союз,	геополитика,	внешняя	
политика.
Five countries of Central Asian Region (CAR) are the main territorial center of southeast part of 
Eurasia which area is 4 million km2, and the population is more 50 million people. The states of 
CAR at the beginning of the 90th of the XX century entered a new stage of development. Finding 
of independence and an exit to the international scene as independent subjects of the international 
relations changed status and political value of the region.
Today the CAR is in focus of attention of the leading powers and the international organizations, 
as well became a cooperation field wide on the range and structure of participants and at the 
same time it is the arena of rivalry of various forces for the influence. First of all, it is caused by 
the geostrategic importance of the region, its powerful oil and gas and other mineral raw material 
resources. The existing asymmetry of geopolitical fields of various powers in the region bears a 
threat to security. The largest powers border on the CAR. Geoeconomic and geopolitical vulnerability 
of the CAR predetermines a tendency of increase of political and geoeconomic presence of interests 
of these powers in the region.
The Central Asia is a place where interests of the world powers, in particular, the EU, China, Iran, 
and Turkey are crossed, and these interests are not always coincided. Taking it into account, it would 
be useful to consider interrelation between efforts of the regional and extra regional states in creation 
of regional system of interaction of the world powers` sometimes competing interests.
It should be noted that the European Union as the priority purpose of the policy in the east 
considered, first of all, support of democratic institutes [1]. The Concept of the EU concerning the CIS 
was based on idea that the technical and financial aid from Europe will help economic stabilization 
of the new independent states, strengthening of democracy and will reduce to a minimum risk of 
destabilization by that. For the European Union as the result of the policy it was necessary to have 
ÌÅÌËÅÊÅÒÒІÊ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîåóïðàâëåíèå èãîñóäàðñòâåííàÿ
ñëóæáà
31
a politically and economically stable, cut-out according to the European standards of parliamentary 
mode, predictable space in the neighborhood, consisting from the states organized on model of the 
EU and cooperating among themselves.
At the very beginning of formation of a foreign and external economic policy the leaders of the 
republics of Central Asia had a clear understanding of that fact that Western Europe, institutes of 
the European community are that political and economic force which should be considered when 
developing strategy of foreign policy of each state.
So, for example, already in the first conceptual document “Strategy of Formation and Development 
of Kazakhstan as Sovereign State” in 1992 the President N. Nazarbayev noted that “the policy of entry 
into the world community is built taking into account a due assessment of partnership opportunities 
of three market system main centers – the USA, Japan and Western Europe, bearing in mind that 
they acted as the incentive force of an intensification of world economic communications. Interaction 
with them also opens a way to the international financial institutions” [2]. Thus, cooperation with the 
EU was understood first of all in an economic context.
Serious changes in the relations between Kazakhstan and the EU happened at the beginning of 
December, 1991 when it was already clear that collapse of the USSR is inevitable. On December 
2, 1991 the delegation of European Parliament headed by the Chairman of the Commission on the 
USSR Relations M. Hoff arrived to Alma-Ata. The delegation was accepted by S. Abdildin, the Acting 
Chairman of the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan. The first democratic election of the President of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan was the main political news of these days. The preliminary agreement 
on establishment of close and mutually advantageous contacts of the EU with Kazakhstan was 
reached. On December 3 the Head of the Delegation M. Hoff met the president N. Nazarbayev who 
was invited to a meeting with the European Parliament.
In the next weeks dynamics of events was defined by an event of enormous geopolitical 
importance – official abolition of the USSR. On December 16, 1991 in Brussels the extraordinary 
meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU Member States took place. At the meeting the principles 
of recognition of the new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were defined. And, at last, 
on December 31, 1991 it was known of the joint statement of Community on recognition of the 
former Soviet Republics on the basis of the assurances received from them that they are ready to 
satisfy the conditions reflected in “The Principles of Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union”. The last day 1991 can be considered date when equal from the point of view 
of international law the bilateral relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan (further the RK) and the 
European Community started.
In 1992 relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EU developed rather dynamically. 
An extreme interest of the European community in an intensification of the relations with Kazakhstan 
was obviously traced. Already on January 9, 1992 the Commission of the EU prepared information 
on the relations with Kazakhstan. The characteristic feature of the first year of cooperation with the 
EU was the versatility, i.e. the EU formed the strategy of cooperation with the CIS in a complex 
order, revealing the general problems and aspects of cooperation for all republics of the CIS. Such 
policy of the EU was justified in the first years of independence of the new states which signed 
standard and collective agreements with the EU. The protocol signed on February 11, 1992 between 
the Commission of the EU and 12 independent states of the former USSR providing the institutional 
mechanism of technical cooperation for 1992 was one of such documents.
On March 3, 1992, when Kazakhstan entered the UN, N. Nazarbayev accepted the next delegation 
of the EU Commission headed by F. Andriyassen, the Vice-Chairman. Both parties confirmed 
aspiration to adjustment of direct contacts. For a rising of the relations N. Nazarbayev was invited to 
higher level to Brussels for the solution of the corresponding circle of questions.
In April, 1992 the relations between the EU and the RK were raised to the level of inter-
parliamentary contacts. On April 7, 1992 the parliamentary delegation of the RK led by S. Abdildin 
arrived to Strasbourg by the invitation of European Parliament. The Delegation was accepted by 
the President of the European Parliament E. Klepch on April 15. The parties discussed a circle of 
the questions representing mutual interest. Soon the Commission of the EU and the Government of 
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Kazakhstan signed the Memorandum of Financing that became the beginning of implementation of 
the TACIS Program in Kazakhstan. In September, 1992 the Coordination Bureau on implementation 
of the TACIS Program in Kazakhstan was created [3].
1992 came to the end with a symbolical action: a year later after disintegration of the Soviet Union 
the European community adopted the Declaration of heads of states and the member governments 
of the EU on readiness to promote process of democratization in the former USSR. Thus, interest of 
the EU in the new independent states accepted more certain political character.
N. Nazarbayev’s visits to Germany (on September 21-23) and France (on September 23–25) 
became large break in the European policy of Kazakhstan in 1992. During these visits the documents 
which deepened economic and political cooperation of the RK with the largest states of Europe 
were signed. Thus, in 1992 the relations of Kazakhstan developed at two levels: with the certain 
European states and with the EU in general. The main result of this year was the fact that the 
political foundation for cooperation of the RK with the EU and its institutes was laid.
In May, 1993 the Commission of the EU published the document which contained conclusions 
and recommendations of rather further work of the International Fund of Technical Assistance to 
the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Many sections of this document were of great 
importance for the countries of CAR, including the Republic of Kazakhstan. In July, 1993 within 
implementation of the program of the help the CIS and the Commission recommendations 3 million 
ECU were allocated to Kazakhstan for assistance of mass privatization policy in the Republic. The 
following 1994 started with such important for the bilateral relations event as opening of representation 
of the RK at the European Union on the basis of the President N. Nazarbayev`s Decree of on 
assignment of functions of representation of the RK at the EU on the RK Embassy in Belgium. This 
event gave a necessary diplomatic basis to the bilateral relations.
Thus, active contacts during 1993–1994 between the EU and Kazakhstan at various levels, 
including political cooperation, led to establishment of full diplomatic communications. On the agenda 
at the beginning of 1995 there was a question of the conclusion of the full contract. During this 
period the Government of the RK attached paramount significance to strengthening of ties with the 
European countries.
On the basis of experience of the relations with the CIS countries the Commission of the EU in the 
spring of 1994 developed some general provisions concerning development of the further relations 
between the EU, Russia and other CIS countries. On the basis of all data the Commission came to 
a conclusion that it was necessary to give urgently a priority to the conclusion of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements covering a wide number of areas and providing gradual creation of a free 
trade zone. At the same time the Commission clearly expressed that Russia and other CIS countries 
should not consider on the accession to the EU as full partners in the near future.
The commission defined three main lines of conduct in the relations with the CIS:
a) Strengthening of economic cooperation and addition it with other types of multilateral cooperation 
and long-term programs; as industrial partners the EU chose only Russia and Ukraine;
b) Further strengthening of political cooperation; Russia and CIS ha to understand meaning of 
“joint foreign and defensive policy” of the EU;
c) Development of cooperation within joint policy on internal affairs and legal questions.
On April 22, 1994 the European Parliament adopted the Resolution on providing the western help 
to the CIS countries. The Resolution contained requirements of trade liberalization, stabilization of 
currency systems, assignment for the special purposes, revision of regulations of TACIS for 1995, 
increase of the Commission staff. In the resolution it was emphasized that the EU gave to 78% of 
all help of the West to the CIS countries (54 of 85 billion dollars) during the period from September, 
1990 to December, 1993. [4]
Concerning the countries of CAR during the same period (spring of 1994) the European 
Commission on Technical Assistance took the initiative of de - monopolization and modernization 
of the industry. The main goal of this project was to force emergence of new economic structures, 
transformation of sector and regional monopolies into competitive groups, establishment of systems 
on price control in the region.
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On May 24, 1994 the European Union initialed, in particular, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan, and one week later – with the Kyrgyz Republic. It 
was supposed that official signing of these documents would take place in the next weeks. It was 
noted that the documents prepared for signing with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan differed a little from 
the ones prepared for signing with Ukraine and Russia. They were formed within Directives of the 
European Council of October 5, 1992.
The main distinctive feature of all agreements of the EU is that they are the so-called “mixed” 
documents and concluded both with the Community and with its State Parties. Besides the 
European Parliament they must be ratified by the national parliaments of the states of the EU. 
As implementation of all procedures could take till two years, they stipulated that during complex 
ratification so-called “interim agreements” would be applied. Their coming into effect requires only 
approval of the European Parliament and Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the EU.
It should be noted that concerning Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements did not have elements of a strict arrangement, as in a case with Ukraine and especially 
Russia. In particular, demands for strengthening of control of the nuclear industry and restriction of 
free trade were not made to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The trade was the basis of the signing of the Agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan. 
This trade was dynamically developing in the first years of independent development of the RK. 
In 1992–1993 exports of the EU to Kazakhstan grew up 3, 96 times more, and import – up 3, 19. 
Especially the trade actively developed in such spheres as mineral raw materials, plastic, jewels, 
metals, electrical equipment and machine-tool construction, optics. Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden (at that time it was not a full participant of the EU) were the largest trade partners of 
Kazakhstan in 1992. In 1993 trade with Great Britain and Italy increased. The large companies and 
the governments of these states were interested in the fastest contractual registration of all wide 
range of the relations with Kazakhstan [5].
At the beginning of September, 1994 the EU Commission strengthened control of illegal import 
of nuclear and radioactive materials. Innovations in this area concerned also Kazakhstan which on 
diplomatic channels received the letter FROM the European Parliament President with an appeal to 
pay attention to questions of nuclear non-proliferation. The answer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the RK was that Kazakhstan was faithful to the obligations to IAEA within the NPT and the START, 
besides fight against nuclear smuggling, the EU began a full-scale offensive against organized 
crime. On September 8,so-called Berlin declaration was accepted. At the same time the Commission 
of the EU took a number of anti-dumping measures in trade with the CIS countries.
In 1994 revision of the system of general preferences (SGP), i.e. measures in the field of 
trade with developing countries began. The European Commission entered three-year measures of 
regulation of trade for 1995–1997 with full introduction of new system in 1998. It meant that some 
types of goods lost preferential customs discounts. It affected also the CAR concerning mineral 
fertilizers and production of the general metallurgy. Thus, proclaiming the principles of free trade and 
competition, the help of the CIS, the European Union simultaneously started taking measures for 
protection of the market against production from the CIS. Thereby the positive effect from technical 
assistance programs was reduced to a minimum.
At the summit in Essen on October 9, 1994 the State Parties of the European Union accepted 
“The Document on Strategy” which was urged to define policy of the Union for some years ahead. 
The central place in the document was taken by the new strategy of the EU aimed at cooperation 
and integration into the Union of the states of the Central and Eastern Europe. Besides this region 
the EU  gave great value to cooperation with the Mediterranean states. Thus, the majority of the 
states of the CIS including the CAR remained on the periphery of the European economic and 
political interests.
On December 28, 1994 the Council of Europe coordinated the position reflecting the general 
strategy of the EU for steel. It was addressed, first of all, to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and 
concerned establishment of import quotas of production of steel from these countries for 1995–1996. 
It was coordinated that the quota for the former Soviet Union would be divided between Russia, 
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Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The quota increased for 35% in 1995 and 15% in 1996. It included 330 
000 tons 5% from which fell to the share of Kazakhstan (6% – Russia and 35% – Ukraine). The 
increase in a quota was especially important for Kazakhstan, whose steel export to EU countries in 
1994 fell from 131 thousand tons to 23 thousand tons that was lower than a level of 1992. Changes 
in the European policy on steel could be regarded as a positive signal in anticipation of conclusion 
of agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan [6].
It is necessary to consider strategy of the EU not only in relation to the CIS in general, but also 
to Central Asia. It was based on the following postulates:
 – transition of the former Soviet Republics to independence was especially difficult for the 
states of Central Asia;
 – The EU had important interests in Central Asia which were connected with geopolitics and 
economy, development in the region of the energy sector was especially important for the EU;
 – The EU saw achievement of the purposes in the region through development of democratic 
institutes, reduction of conflict potential, implementation of economic reforms;
 – The EU connected the safety with opportunity to influence decision-making in an energy and 
production of mineral resources [7].
In the special communiqué prepared by the Commission of the EU detailed interpretation of 
interests of the EU in the Central Asian region and vision of the relations of the European Union 
and Central Asia from Brussels are given. In the document huge value for world economy of the 
forthcoming operation of oil and gas resources in east part of the Caspian Sea is emphasized; 
concern in destiny of democratic institute sand slipping of at least three republics of the region to 
authoritarianism are expressed, and possibility of Russia to keep further the influence, “a challenge 
to which it is thrown already down in Tajikistan” [8] is put into question.
Then in the communiqué it was emphasized that the EU already became the influential player on 
a Central Asian scene. Europe was the only largest potential market for Central Asian producers of 
power raw materials, besides the CIS. Among external factors which the EU had to consider in the 
policy in the region, in the document were called as Russia (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as objects 
of its influence); the war in Afghanistan (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were involved); the United 
States, whose policy was aimed at the development of Kyrgyzstan as an experienced model for the 
region; Turkey, which carried out rapprochement with the region in cultural, economic and military 
areas; China, which intended to strengthen the influence in the region through trade; Iran, Pakistan 
and India seeking to develop the relations with the states of the region, but their opportunity were 
limited.
In the communiqué it was noted that only Uzbekistan had an understanding of capacity of the EU 
as political partner. In foreign policy of Kazakhstan orientation to Russia and the United States was 
too strong. Further authors draw a conclusion: considering that only 50% of the gas consumed by 
the European countries had the Russian origin, the voice of the European Union had to be heard 
at the solution of such problems, as production of hydrocarbons, construction of gas pipelines and 
definition of the status of the Caspian Sea.
When determining the strategy concerning the region authors of the document urged the European 
Union to consider such factors as possibilities of Central Asia with the population of 52 million people 
as the market of consumer goods of the European origin. It was indicated also the need to consider 
ethnic communications and presence of the German and Greek population in Kazakhstan. They call 
such events as distribution of the split materials and drug trafficking, and the conflict in Tajikistan as 
threats for stability of the region and the European - Central Asian cooperation [9].
Thus, by the end of 1994 there were all prerequisites and conditions – economic, political and 
diplomatic – for full cooperation of the CAR with the European Union. This need was insistently felt 
by both parties. The EU already had the developed strategy for the policy for the new independent 
states in the territory of the former Soviet Union. If necessary it adapted in relation to the Central 
Asian region and the certain states. As it was noted above, important political and economic interests 
of the EU in the region were the cornerstone of the European strategy and it was openly declared in 
official documents. It is necessary to emphasize extremely active, offensive nature of the European 
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strategy in the CIS. Thanks to this factor rather fast passing of a preparatory stage in the relations 
between the EU and the countries of CAR became possible. In turn, the states of CAR did everything 
possible to lift the relations with the EU on higher level, to open the representations in Brussels, to 
accept programs for cooperation and technical assistance, to create the maximum conditions for 
their realization.
By the end 1994 – the beginning of 1995 both parties closely came nearer to signing of Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements, to be exact, the whole complex of documents. For Kazakhstan this 
event occurred on January 23, 1995 in Brussels where the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev 
arrived. The document was signed by the President of Kazakhstan and the Chairman of the EU 
Council Alain Juppé. Together with the Agreement they signed a temporary contract on trade which 
purpose was involving trade and economic part of the Agreement. In the performance at the time of 
signing of these documents the President of Kazakhstan noted that the CIS countries should follow 
the example of the European Union which is based on four freedoms: free movement of goods, 
labor, services and capital.” We see in the EU, said N. Nazarbayev, a worthy example for imitation, a 
sample of the main, most perspective and effective direction of the economic and political integration 
turned into the XXI century” [10].
The signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the RK and the EU and related 
documents captured practically all contact areas of mutual interests of Kazakhstan, the European 
states and their institutes. Behind there was a preparatory stage after which the signed documents 
opened the road to dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation. However it was clear from the very 
beginning that the economic and political weight of the parties is incommensurable. And if one party 
(Kazakhstan) obviously could not use fully the advantages given by the Agreement in view of the 
objective economic and technological backwardness, other party presented by powerful industrial 
powers had an opportunity for the most effective use of the Kazakhstan market. There was a collision 
of two tendencies generated by a texture of interests of Kazakhstan and the European corporations. 
Kazakhstan hoped for serious investments from the EU which could raise the economics in rather 
short time; the European countries did not wish to invest money in economics of Kazakhstan until 
the principles, laws and rules used in the EU were approved in the RK. All this found reflection in 
the Agreement which opened the road to the European investments into Kazakhstan, on the one 
hand, and with another it forced to work in the economic, trade and legislative policy in compliance 
with the European standards.
At the same time, in the European political circles in 1995 they realized that unconditional following 
to the western recipes of economics reforming conducted to growth of social tension, threatened 
political stability in the CIS countries and created, eventually, threat of the European stability and 
safety which providing was a main goal of the European Union.
In April, 1995 France as the Chairman of the EU Council, made statement in the European 
Parliament for policy in relation to the CIS. A. Lamasyur noted in the statement that the republics 
of Central Asia still had the problem of human rights violation, especially in Tajikistan. In this regard 
France insisted on strict implementation of the Pact on Stability adopted on March 20, 1995 in Paris. 
But the main problem, to which the European Commission paid attention, was a development of 
democracy in the countries of the former USSR. For this purpose the Commission suggested to revise 
the TACIS Program for giving of bigger flexibility to it, but thus having kept its democratic orientation. 
The German social democrats raised a question of situation in Kazakhstan after dissolution of 
parliament. They insisted on impossibility of implementation of the Agreement between the EU and 
the RK in the conditions of the parliament absence. The representatives of Spain joined this position 
after they made a trip on the CIS countries as a part of delegation of the European Parliament. 
The Swedish left insisted that the EU had to keep a firm position and not make a compromise in 
questions of human rights, anywhere: in Russia, Kazakhstan or Turkey. However, also the balanced 
estimates sounded. So, the famous sovietologist E.Carrerd’Ancos emphasized that it was necessary 
to create bases for dialogue with the CIS countries, despite failures in development of democracy. 
As a result of discussions the European Parliament adopted the resolution in which procedure of 
ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan was postponed until in 
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the country free elections were not held. The important principle was brought in the resolution: a 
condition of implementation of the Partnership Agreements was observance of human rights and 
rights of minorities, and a main objective of the Agreements was the help in transition to market 
economy.
In June, 1995 the Commission of the European Union approved the project of strategy concerning 
the states of Central Asia. In the project first of all importance of preservation of stability in the region 
was emphasized. This project was prepared at the initiative of the member of the Commission of 
H. Van den Brook. The region was a value for the European Union first of all thanks to the natural 
resources. However in the project difficulty of transformation of the region and reforming of its 
economy was emphasized. The contribution of the EU seemed in the project as active support of 
creation of the indicative democratic organizations, assistance to reduction of scales of the conflicts 
and promotion of economic reforms. In the project the criterion of political conditionality, first of all 
concerning Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was used. Concerning Kazakhstan the demand about the 
conclusion of the intermediate agreement on trade and ratification of the Partnership Agreement 
was made. Thus, the project was in a conflict with decisions of the EU member states parliaments 
to postpone ratification of the Agreement because of doubts concerning democratic processes 
in Kazakhstan. Authors of the project of strategy considered this circumstance, but insisted that 
the delay of the agreement implementation did not disturb negotiations and implementation of 
sectorial agreements on steel and trade in radioactive materials. In November, 1996 the European 
Commission prepared a final version of the Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of nuclear safety.
It is impossible to consider policy of the European Union out of the general context of all problems 
connected with safety and geo-strategy of the West concerning the CIS. These are such problems 
as expansion of NATO, control of the nuclear weapon and disarmament, “Partnership for Peace” and 
cooperation of the states of Central Asia with NATO, a problem of the West European Union and 
some other. All this complex of questions of international policy and safety inevitably left a mark on 
the relations of the countries of CAR with Europe.
It was such a general political background on which cooperation between the countries of CAR 
and the West European countries in 1995-1997 developed. The differentiated relation as with the 
European alliance in general, and the certain states of Europe, on the one hand, and the states of 
CAR with another became its characteristic. First of all they were Great Britain, Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain.
Especially it is necessary to pay attention to political aspect of the relations of Kazakhstan with 
the European Union and the certain European Union countries. They were not as politicized as 
the Kazakhstan-American relations, but in certain cases as it was in 1995, the EU did attempts to 
influence political processes in Kazakhstan. But it is necessary to stipulate that the political relations 
between the RK and the EU developed in much more reserved forms than with some states of 
the near and far abroad. It in many respects explains both an economic and geostrategic non-
involvement of the EU in Central Asia and actually in Kazakhstan.
Apparently, if economic and geostrategic interests of the EU in the region were stronger, intervention 
of the European Union in domestic policy of Central Asia would be more effective. However in 
general strategy of the EU is part of the general strategy of the western industrial states directed first 
of all on ensuring the national interests. In relation to the Kazakhstan and European relations they 
are understood as interest of the EU in preservation of stability in Kazakhstan and other countries of 
CAR, carrying out of deep economic, social and political reforms in them which have to strengthen 
stability and predictability of the new independent states. On the other side politicians of the EU 
repeatedly emphasized interest of the Union in resources of Central Asia and especially Kazakhstan, 
in use of power and communication opportunities of the region. Activity of the EU during 1991–1997 
was directed on realization of these purposes; first of all it concerned the Caspian Sea.
According to the European strategists, the Caspian region should be considered in the context 
of interests of NATO as the zone getting under action of the purposes and the principles of the 
Washington Agreement and New Strategic Concept (1991). According to these documents the 
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states of the region were considered as part of a conflict zone on the southern flank of NATO and got 
to the sphere of activity of the Southern command of Alliance. From the strategic point of view, thus, 
these states were considered as important for safety of Alliance that was recorded in the relevant 
documents and directives of NATO [11].
The German authors Erhard and Tvirt call the European Union the second important political 
force which intends to play an own role in the Caspian region and has the interests here. The EU is 
characterized today as not military power which in recent years has been making efforts to develop 
own collective foreign and defensive policy. Starting point in this direction, as these experts consider, 
is activity of the European commission on development of uniform European power policy and 
ensuring energy security of the EU. All this has a direct relation to the Caspian region.
The most essential defect of policy of the EU in the Caspian region, as these authors consider, 
is lack of coherent political strategy. It means that various aspects of strategic approach of the EU 
offered by the European Commission in the Caspian region actually are shelved in the Council of 
Europe or significantly emasculated. The reasons of it lie, first, that in this board there is no common 
point of view on future power supply of Europe and on its interrelation with problems of safety and 
ecology; secondly, national interests of the certain states prevail over all-European, and interests of 
oil and gas concerns are put over the national; thirdly, the EU stakes first of all on logic of the market 
relations and economic feasibility at decision-making that is strongly interfered by a divergence in 
estimates of hydrocarbons reserves on the Caspian Sea, high investment expenses, extremely slow 
processes of transformation in the states of the region and the high conflict potential and, at last, low 
estimates of growth prospects of need of the European economy in export of hydrocarbons.
From the political point of view the EU places emphasis on avoiding creation of any anti-Russian 
alliances in the region, and sees future implementation of the interests within close cooperation and 
partnership with Russia. However the German experts emphasize that in the short term interests 
of the EU lie not in the Caspian or Black Sea regions, but in ensuring the expansion to the east. 
Only then the EU will be able to influence more effectively decrease in conflict potential both in the 
Caucasus, and in Central Asia [12].
OSCE is one more international institute which is directly entering a circle interested in the 
relations with the Central Asian countries. The mention that Central Asia represents an integral part 
of system of the European safety was essential point of the major documents of this organization 
in new post-confrontational conditions, first of all in the Parisian Charter of 1990. All further strategy 
of the organization within the 1990th was based on this point. Emphasis in the policy of OSCE 
was placed on implementation of preventive measures to avoid the local conflicts and the armed 
opposition, and also the organization of peacekeeping missions.
In estimates of development prospects of relations with the Caspian states it was emphasized 
that they cannot be considered as potential candidates for reception for NATO or the European 
Union under any circumstances. Their participation in OSCE should be considered as one of 
channels for strengthening of influence of Europe in the Caspian and Central Asian region. All these 
institutes – NATO, the EU and OSCE can serve one purpose: to promote strengthening of 
independence of the young states of the region and formation here of the long-term and stable 
democratic modes. In this regard the European analysts do not have any doubts in the necessity of 
activity of these organizations in the Caspian and Central Asian region in the near-term perspective. 
However they emphasize that the Russian factor is a sensitive place of this policy.
Thus, the European policy for Kazakhstan and other countries of the Caspian region will be held 
in the long term on their gradual involvement in the course of the all-European strategy which is 
based on gradual strengthening of the European financial and political institutions in the region, use 
of the internal political processes connected with democratization of the state models in the countries 
of the region, involvement of OSCE for the solution of ecological, economic and political tasks.
This policy of the EU leaves a place as for coincidence of interests with the countries of the region, 
and for contradictions. It is obvious that creation of climate of stability under the European roof is 
equitable to interests of the large investors interested in accurately established frame conditions as 
international legal base for their activity on the Caspian region. But it does not mean that such policy 
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cannot from time to time conflict to private interests of the separate international consortiums which 
have participants – countries of CAR. There is one more fact that causes collisions of interests. It is 
aspiration of Europeans to put all transactions in the Caspian region on “a legal basis” that in reality 
can be a complete control over oil activity on the Caspian Sea from the EU.
It is not a secret that so far the policy of the EU in the Caspian region was in a shadow of policy 
of large international oil cartels and the United States which represented their interests. In this 
regard the policy of the USA is perceived often as the general strategy of the West. The EU has 
own political and economic interests in the Caspian region. A main goal of the European states is 
preservation of stability in the region in the conditions of which they could increase the political and 
economic presence. The European states express discontent that their companies have no such 
individual share in joint projects or comparable with it, as American.
Thus, the first collision of interests of the European and American interests on the Caspian Sea 
is already designated, where Europeans demand the rights for development of resources of the 
region, equal with the American companies. Further, the German social democrats, speaking about 
interests of the EU, as an indispensable condition of stability expose the requirement to consider 
interests of all the states which are somehow involved in a solution of the problem of the Caspian 
energy resources. The list of these countries includes China, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan besides 
eight republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia, Turkey, the USA and the EU. However 
all policy of the USA is directed on isolation of Iran from the solution of the Caspian problem unlike 
the European states` policy which carries on “critical dialogue” with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). 
The anti-Russian policy of Washington on minimization of influence of Moscow in the region is being 
developed in the same direction, and Europeans do not accept it. 
But at last, the manner in which the USA declared the region “a zone of the strategic and 
vital interests” cannot be pleasant to the European countries which are sincerely sure that energy 
resources of the Caspian region have to serve interests of the united Europe from Atlantic to the 
Urals.
Thus, the essence of contradictions which can arise between the USA, on the one hand, and 
other states of the EU – with another, in a zone of the Caspian region is reduced to that Europe 
will increase requirements about creation of equal frame conditions for itself and other European 
countries at the favorable mode of protection of investments, stability and cooperation. However to 
develop and to support such a favorable investment climate in the Caspian region, it is necessary 
to have power and geopolitical influence of global scale. But the states of the EU do not have such 
kind of influence as the United States does. It is quite probable that imaginary and true contradictions 
between the EU and the USA will smooth out to stand together for protection of interests of the 
industrial world which needs a new inflow of energy resources. It can be understood as uniform 
strategy of the West concerning future of the Caspian region.
For the republics of the Central Asia, in our opinion, it is advisable strengthen the European 
activity on the Caspian Sea for a number of reasons. The reasons are the following:
Within the integration concept of the CAR and multi vectored foreign policy strengthening of 
positions of the European Union would be desirable in the context of creation of a counterbalance to 
excessive influence of the USA and Russia, and China – in the long term perspective.
Economic involvement of the European states in the Caspian region would promote an intensification 
of the economic relations between the CAR and the EU in general, fuller implementation of economic 
programs of the EU for assistance to the local republics and their further expansion.
The CAR states, in the person of EU countries, as well as other producers of energy resources 
in the region, would receive the guaranteed consumer of the production for some decades ahead 
within creation of the United European Power System that is provided by the Power Charter Contract.
Connection of power systems of the EU and the Caspian region can be well reflected in 
development of communications and the general economic level of the countries of CAR.
Active cooperation with the European countries will promote strengthening of stability in the 
former Soviet Union, on the one hand, and on another - sharp reduction of confrontation risk.
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